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RACE AND NEGOTIATION PERFORMANCE*
By Charles B. Craver**
In major league baseball, nineteen percent of the players are black.
As of 1992, 150 of the 200 agents registered with Major League
Baseball Players Association had active clientele; black agents
accounted for a mere three percent of this 150. In professional
football, sixty-nine percent of the players are black, but black
agents comprise only fourteen percent of the registered agents with
active files. Worse yet, more than eighty percent of the NBA’s
players are black, but less than ten percent of them have black
agents.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Why are many prominent black athletes reluctant to retain black agents to represent them?
One factor undoubtedly concerns the high profile success of white agents such as David Falk in
basketball and Leigh Steinberg in football, and the ability of these super-agents to attract draft
eligible black athletes.2 Another may involve the fact that “many black players have internalized
racial stereotypes about blacks and thus, discriminate against their own people.”3 The athletes may
privately believe that white agents can negotiate better contracts than black agents.
Mr. Sammataro reasonably asks “whether there are in fact any meaningful differences in the
manner in which white and black agents negotiate and, more importantly, whether these differences
significantly affect the resulting contracts.”4 One wonders what other groups ask similar questions
regarding the negotiating capabilities of white and black professionals. Do hiring partners at law
firms and business entities consciously or subconsciously question the negotiating ability of black
law or business school graduates who are seeking new employment? Do law firm partners or
corporate managers raise similar concerns when they decide which individuals to make partners or
upper level managers? Are the unvoiced suspicions of such crucial decision-makers supported by
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empirical findings?5
This article will empirically compare the results achieved by black and white students on the
exercises conducted in my Legal Negotiating course. It will initially explore the perceived
differences between African-American and Caucasian behavior. Statistically established distinctions
relevant to negotiation interactions will be examined, and unsupportable stereotypes will be
discussed. Comparisons will be made concerning the manner in which African-Americans and
Caucasians deal with the stress of highly competitive situations.
A statistical comparison will then be made between the results achieved by African-American
and Caucasian students over the past 9 years on the negotiation exercises employed in my Legal
Negotiating course. Despite the fact that some stereotypical beliefs might suggest that AfricanAmericans would not be as effective as their Caucasian cohorts in such competitive encounters, my
anecdotal experiences have not discerned any apparent differences regarding the results attained by
African-American and Caucasian students. I have thus hypothesized that I would find no statistically
significant differences between the settlements achieved by the African-American and Caucasian
students in my Legal Negotiating course. This Null Hypothesis includes two basic components. First,
that the average results obtained by African-American and Caucasian students would be
approximately equal. Second, that there would be no evidence to suggest that Caucasian negotiators
have employed a more competitive approach that might generate similar means, but more skewed
results evidenced by higher standard deviations.

II. REAL AND PERCEIVED RACIAL DIFFERENCES
Negotiations involving participants from diverse ethnic backgrounds frequently develop
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differently than bargaining interactions involving persons from similar backgrounds. People tend to
negotiate more cooperatively with opponents of the same race and culture than with adversaries of
different races and cultures.6 This is due to the fact that similarity induces trust and reduces the need
for the interactors to maintain a particular “face” in each other’s eyes.
Different meanings may be ascribed to identical speech and behavior by members of different
races because of their different acculturation experiences.7 For example, if an African-American and
a Caucasian were to encounter a rude server at a restaurant, they would be likely to view the situation
differently depending upon the race of the server. If the server were Caucasian, the African-American
customer might attribute the poor treatment to the server’s dislike of black patrons, while the
Caucasian customer might simply consider that particular server rude. On the other hand, if the
server were black, the white patron might decide that the server is hostile toward white customers,
while the black customer might perceive no racial element. If a Caucasian hiring partner of a
prestigious law firm were to ask white and black law student applicants about their LSAT scores and
law school GPAs, the Caucasian students would probably provide the requested information without
hesitancy, while the African-American students might wonder if the partner were only asking black
students about such factors based upon that person’s biased belief that minority law students are less
qualified than their non-minority cohorts.
Individuals from different ethnic backgrounds bring certain stereotypical baggage into their
new interactions.8 It is amazing how many common characteristics – positive, negative, and neutral
-- are attributed by many persons to all individuals of a particular race. Professor Andrea Rich’s
study of the perceptions of UCLA undergraduate students in the early 1970s graphically
demonstrated how closely Caucasians and Chicanos stereotyped African-Americans, Caucasians and
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African-Americans stereotyped Chicanos, and African-Americans and Chicanos stereotyped
Caucasians.9 When people who harbor such stereotypical beliefs initially encounter individuals from
other races, they tend to attribute their stereotypical preconceptions to those persons, and this
phenomenon may influence the preliminary portion of their interaction.
Students I have taught at various law schools over the past twenty-five years have often
allowed their stereotypical beliefs to influence their bargaining encounters. Many of my students –
regardless of their ethnicity – think that Caucasian males are the most Machiavellian and competitive
negotiators. They expect them to employ adversarial and manipulative tactics to obtain optimal
results for themselves. On the other hand, numerous students expect African-American, AsianAmerican, and Latino-American negotiators to be more accommodating and less competitive. When
opponents fail to behave in the anticipated manner, the bargaining process may be adversely affected.
Even members of one race may stereotype other members of the same race. Several years
ago, four African-American students in my class were randomly selected to work together on a
negotiation exercise. They seemed so pleased to have the opportunity to conduct an exercise entirely
with other African-American colleagues. When they had their initial meeting, both sides announced
their opening offers. They discussed their respective positions for a while, but neither side changed
its stated position. Even though the two teams met for several hours over two more days, neither side
modified its first offer. When we discussed their resulting nonsettlement in class, I asked each pair
why they had been unwilling to move toward the opposing side. It turned out that neither side had
been willing to move, because each team has expected their “less competitive” African-American
adversaries to make the first concession!
Despite the unreliability of many stereotypical beliefs and the absence of more recent surveys,
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several empirical studies have found a few relevant differences between African-American and
Caucasian interactants. African-Americans tend to be high in terms of Interpersonal Orientation
(IO).10 High IO individuals are more sensitive and responsive to the interpersonal aspects of their
relationships with others.11 This tendency should make African-American more effective negotiators.
Since bargaining outcomes are directly affected by the interpersonal skills of the participants, high
IO individuals should be able to achieve better results than their low IO cohorts.
During verbal encounters, African-Americans tend to speak more forcefully and with greater
verbal aggressiveness than Caucasians.12 In competitive settings, this trait might enhance the
bargaining effectiveness of individuals with these traits, while in cooperative situations it might
undermine their ability to achieve mutual accords. When they interact with others, AfricanAmericans tend to make less eye contact while listening to others than do Caucasians, which may
be perceived by speakers as an indication of indifference to what is being said or disrespect toward
the speaker.13 Such behavior might undermine the ability of the persons with minimal eye contact
to establish the kind of rapport that can advance bargaining discussions.
Most negotiators tend to employ a cooperative/problem-solving or a competitive/adversarial
style when they bargain with others.14 Cooperative/problem-solvers tend to be open with their
information, prefer to use objective criteria to guide their discussions, and endeavor to maximize the
joint return achieved by interactants, while competitive/adversarials tend to be less open with
information, focus more on stated positions than objective factors, are manipulative, and attempt to
maximize their own side’s return. Caucasian negotiators usually employ relatively consistent
bargaining styles, while African-Americans tend to adopt styles that are reflective of the race of their
opponents. They tend to perform more effectively when they compete with Caucasians and when
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they cooperate with other African-Americans.15
African-Americans who have experienced discriminatory treatment by Caucasian teachers
and classmates may be initially distrustful of White negotiating opponents. They may fear that
Caucasian students think they have the right to get more advantageous bargaining terms than their
black cohorts. Such beliefs may cause black negotiators to behave more cautiously and less
trustingly, making it more difficult for the bargainers to achieve mutually efficient agreements. This
would undermine the ability of both sides to obtain optimal results.

III. LEGAL NEGOTIATING COURSE METHODOLOGY
The initial Legal Negotiating class is devoted to an explanation of the course format and the
evaluation process. I tell the students that they will explore the negotiation process and the factors
that influence bargaining encounters. They will engage in a series of negotiation exercises. Although
the first two or three simulations will be for practice purposes and will not affect course grades, the
next five exercises will be used to determine two-thirds of class grades.16 Each negotiation exercise
is structured in a “duplicate bridge” format. Every participant receives identical General Information
describing the relevant factual circumstances and the specific issues that must be resolved through
the negotiation process. All of the individuals on the same side of an exercise receive the same
Confidential Information apprising them of special information possessed by their client, explaining
their client’s bargaining objectives, and the manner in which they will be evaluated if they achieve
agreements or fail to generate accords. They are usually assigned one or two zero-sum problems that
only concern the amount of money one side will pay to the other, because many litigation and nonlitigation interactions are limited to these types of “distributive” situations that involve head-to-head
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competition.17 They are also assigned several non-zero-sum exercises that permit cooperative
negotiating parties to simultaneously increase their respective satisfaction levels through efficient
“integrative” bargaining that is designed to maximize the joint return achieved by the participants.
Class members negotiate on a one-against-one or a two-against-two basis. On some
occasions, students are assigned partners to assist them with complex issues and to demonstrate the
difficulties negotiators may encounter with respect to individuals on their own side. The students
learn that in practice opposing counsel often achieve tentative accords with minimal difficulty, and
thereafter encounter problems when they try to convince their respective clients to accept the
reasonable terms negotiated. For each exercise, participants are randomly assigned different
opponents and, when relevant, different partners. This is done to maximize the number of individuals
with whom they will interact throughout the term18 and to prevent one student from having an
excessive impact on the course grade of another student.
I evaluate the performances of class members on a curve, based on each side’s results
measured against the scoring information contained in that side’s Confidential Information. The
students are then ranked from high to low and are assigned “placement” points for grading purposes.
For example, if ten groups of students negotiate on a two-against-two basis, the most successful
team on Side A receives ten placement points, the second highest receives nine placement points,
and so forth. A similar ranking process is carried out with respect to the individuals on Side B. If
twenty pairs of students interact on a one-against-one basis, the highest student on Side still receives
ten placement points, but the second highest student receives 9.5 placement points, the third highest
participant receives 9.0 placement points, and so forth. This half-step scale is used to provide the
two-against-two and the one-against-one exercises with equal weight.
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Each class member is also required to prepare a ten- to fifteen-page paper exploring the
negotiation process. The writers are instructed to analyze their bargaining interactions based on the
concepts covered throughout the term. Some papers focus on the different negotiation stages, the
efficacy of diverse bargaining techniques, the impact of race, gender,19 or similar factors on
bargaining encounters, the use of deceptive tactics,20 the importance of verbal and nonverbal
communication, and other similar topics. Students may elect to take the class on a credit/no-credit
basis, and they are informed that they will automatically receive a “credit” if they participate in the
assigned exercises and submit acceptable papers.
During the first half of the semester, we explore theoretical and practical concepts pertaining
to the negotiation process. Students are assigned chapters from Effective Legal Negotiation and
Settlement21 and are encouraged to read Getting to Yes.22 The class considers the psychological
factors that influence negotiation interactions, along with the impact of verbal and nonverbal
communication. Students evaluate the effectiveness of cooperative/problem-solving and
competitive/adversarial bargaining styles, and I encourage them to contemplate the use of a hybrid
competitive/problem-solving approach that is designed to generate beneficial client results while
simultaneously maximizing the joint returns obtained by both sides. The manner in which the
personal needs of clients and attorneys and the different types of legal problems and relationships
may affect bargaining encounters is discussed. The class then examines the various stages of the
negotiation process (Preparation Stage, Preliminary Stage, Information Stage, Distributive Stage,
Closing Stage, and Cooperative Stage23), to apprise students of the primary objectives associated
with each. The strengths and weaknesses of the various techniques negotiators are likely to encounter
are assessed. Specific negotiating issues pertaining to such topics as the commencement of litigation
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settlement talks, dealing with government agencies, telephone negotiations, and the use of neutral
intervenors to facilitate inter-party discussions are next examined. The class explores the impact of
cultural and ethnic differences and gender role expectations on bargaining interactions.
The class considers the use of “attitudinal bargaining” to modify the unacceptable behavior
of some opponents. Students are reminded how much excessively competitive classmates want to
achieve extraordinary results and of the fact that if the less competitive participants are willing to
accept the possible consequences of nonsettlements, those students can usually alter the offensive
conduct of their competitive adversaries. Once overtly competitive individuals realize they may be
forced to forego agreements if they continue to behave inappropriately, they generally conform to
expected class norms.

IV. STATISTICAL FINDINGS
When an observer attempts to determine whether there may be a relationship between
different factors, it is appropriate to establish Null and Alternative Hypotheses. The Null Hypothesis
assumes the absence of any correlation, while the Alternative Hypothesis assumes that some
relationship in fact exists. The relevant data are then analyzed to determine whether there appears
to be a correlation between the factors being compared.
Statistical tests calculate the probability that any observed differences between compared
factors are due to random considerations rather than some alternative explanation. The probability
that any observed difference is due to chance is referred to as the “p-value.”24 Social scientists
traditionally reject the Null Hypothesis when the p-value pertaining to a discerned difference is less
than 0.05, which indicates a probability of less than one in twenty that the observed difference is due
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to chance rather than the assumed alternative explanation.25 When, on the other hand, the probability
is high that the observed difference is due to chance – a p-value above 0.05 – social scientists
traditionally do not reject the Null Hypothesis.26
The logical implications of rejecting or failing to reject a Null Hypothesis are different.
Refusing to reject the Null Hypothesis here means that the data provide no substantial evidence that
there is any relationship between student race and their performance on Legal Negotiating course
exercises.27 When the p-value is greater than 0.05, social scientists conclude that there is no
statistically significant difference between the factors being compared.28
In this study, rejecting the Null Hypothesis means that the data provide sufficient evidence
that an alternative explanation accounts for any observed relationship between student race and their
negotiation exercise performance. In this case, social scientists would conclude that there is a
statistically significant correlation between the measured factors.29 Although it is not certain that the
Alternative Hypothesis actually accounts for the measured relationship, it is reasonable to assume
the presence of the observed correlation in the absence of any other possible explanation.
This study evaluates the possible relationship between student race and negotiation exercise
performance. The Null Hypothesis is that there is no correlation between student race and the results
they achieve on Legal Negotiating course exercises. The Alternative Hypothesis is that there is a
relationship between student race and the results they achieve on Legal Negotiating course exercises.
Although I have sixteen years of Legal Negotiation course data at George Washington
University, I decided to focus on the data covering the past nine years. This decision is based upon
the fact that the classes I taught from 1986 through the Spring of 1992 contained insufficient
numbers of African-American students to permit meaningful statistical comparisons. For two years
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(1988 & 1991), I had no African-American students in my class; for three years (1989, 1990 &
Spring 1992), I had only one African-American student; and in 1986, I had two black students.
Beginning with the Fall of 1992, I began to have greater numbers of African-American
students in my Legal Negotiation classes. Each class from the Spring of 1992 through the Fall of
2000 included at least three African-American students, with some classes containing five, six, and
even seven black students. I thus decided to concentrate on these more recent years, to provide
sufficient data samples to permit meaningful statistical comparisons.
Even if racial differences had no statistically significant impact on the results achieved by
black and white students on my Legal Negotiation course exercises, a separate factor might induce
some observers to anticipate lower average scores by African-American students. As a result of
affirmative action admissions policies designed to enhance law student diversity, some AfricanAmerican students are admitted to law schools with lower undergraduate GPAs and lower LSAT
scores than their Caucasian cohorts. To the extent these factors are predictive of success in law
school – measured by law school GPAs – one might expect African-American students to have
slightly lower law school GPAs than Caucasian students. If this assumption were correct, it might
suggest that lower GPA African-American students would perform less well on negotiation exercises
than higher GPA Caucasian students.
A comparison of the mean GPAs achieved by African-American and Caucasian students in
my Legal Negotiation course from the Fall of 1992 through the Fall of 2000 does indicate slightly
lower GPA averages for African-American students than for Caucasian students. A Pearson
Correlation Coefficient30 was computed which resulted in a coefficient of -0.275 comparing the mean
GPAs of black students with the mean GPAs of white students. The corresponding p-value of 0.0000
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indicates that there is a statistically significant correlation between race and GPAs, with the average
GPAs of African-American students being slightly lower than the average GPAs of Caucasian
students.
Despite the slight differences in GPA means between black and white Legal Negotiation
course students, I did not expect this factor to influence negotiation exercise score results. I had
previously evaluated the correlation between student GPAs and negotiation exercise scores for
George Washington University students and found no statistically significant correlation.31 I also
calculated a Pearson Correlation Coefficient comparing student GPAs with their respective
negotiation exercise scores for the years 1992 through 2000. The coefficient of 0.007 is minuscule,
and the corresponding p-value of 0.880 would strongly suggest the absence of any statistically
significant relationship between student GPAs and their respective negotiation exercise scores. As
a result, I would not expect the slightly lower GPA means for African-American students compared
to their Caucasian cohorts to have any meaningful impact on the negotiation scores achieved by
black and white Legal Negotiation class students over the past nine years. If any negotiation score
differences were found, I would suspect that they would be attributable to the race of the participants
rather than to mean GPA differences between black and white students.
To determine whether there are statistically significant differences between the negotiation
exercise scores achieved by African-American and Caucasian students, I employed two separate
procedures. I first computed the mean scores for black and white students for each of the past nine
years, and compared the mean differences using a t-test.32 The results are set forth in the following
Table.

13
TABLE
t-Test Comparison of Student Race and Negotiation Score Means
______________________________________________________________________________
Year N Wht. N Blk. Mean Wht. Mean Blk. Mean Neg. Wht. Std. Blk. Std. P-Value33
__________________
Neg. Score Neg. Score Score Diff.
Dev.
Dev.
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

51
53
52
44
44
34
31
41
32

3
4
5
4
3
5
6
6
7

41.033
40.630
39.665
28.941
35.016
26.797
33.855
31.661
27.572

38.333
34.825
40.240
36.200
37.800
28.160
33.883
32.200
23.714

2.700
5.805
-0.575
-7.259
-2.784
-1.363
-0.028
-0.539
3.858

9.521
10.845
11.833
9.528
10.137
6.453
7.987
9.995
7.722

7.422 0.6325
13.564 0.3137
11.358 0.9175
7.767 0.1470
9.987 0.6473
7.548 0.6679
8.452 0.9937
6.007 0.8987
8.169
0.2432

The statistical data set forth in the Table provide strong support for the Null Hypothesis.
There is not a single year for which the t-Test resulted in a mean difference based upon race at the
0.05 – or even the 0.10 – level of statistical significance. For three of the nine years34 the mean
negotiation scores for white students were slightly above the mean scores for black students, while
for the other six years,35 the mean negotiation scores for African-American students were slightly
above the mean scores for Caucasian students.
In recognition of the fact that the total number of African-American students in some of the
classes was relatively low, I also calculated a Pearson Correlation Coefficient for the aggregate data
pertaining to all nine years. The correlation coefficient comparing race with mean negotiation
exercise scores was a mere -0.0527, with a p-value of 0.2594. This p-value provides further
statistical support for the Null Hypothesis.
The last factor to be evaluated concerns a comparison of the African-American and
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Caucasian student standard deviations. For five years,36 the standard deviations for white students
were slightly above those for black students, while the reverse was true with respect to the other four
years.37 These data provide support for the second part of the Null Hypothesis – i.e., no statistically
significant difference between white and black student standard deviations.

V. IMPLICATIONS
Individuals who commence negotiations with people of different races should appreciate the
need to establish trusting and cooperative relationships before the serious substantive discussions
begin. This approach should significantly enhance the likelihood of mutually beneficial transactions.
The preliminary stage of their interaction may be used to generate a modicum of rapport.38
Negotiators should try to minimize the counterproductive stereotypes they may consciously or
subconsciously harbor toward persons of their opponent’s ethnicity. If they anticipate difficult
interactions as a result of such usually irrational preconceptions, they are likely to generate selffulfilling prophecies. If they conversely expect their opponents to behave more cooperatively and
less manipulatively because of the ethnicity of their adversaries, they may carelessly lower their
guard of give those persons an inherent bargaining advantage. They must also try to understand any
seemingly illogical reactions their opponents may initially exhibit toward them as a result of those
individuals’ stereotyping of them.
If the first contact negotiators have with opponents indicates that those persons are expecting
highly competitive transactions, they should not hesitate to employ “attitudinal bargaining” to
disabuse their opponents of this preconception.39 They should create cooperative physical and
psychological environments. Warm handshakes and open postures can initially diminish combative
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atmospheres. Cooperative negotiators can sit adjacent to, instead of directly across from, opponents.
In a few instances, it may be necessary to directly broach the subject of negative stereotyping, since
this may be the most efficacious way to negate the influence of these feelings.40
People who participate in bargaining transactions should recognize that the specific
circumstances and unique personal traits of the individual negotiators – rather than generalized
beliefs regarding ethnic characteristics – determine the way in which each interaction evolves. Each
opponent has to be evaluated and dealt with differently. Is that individual a cooperative or a
competitive bargainer? Does the other side possess greater, equal, or less bargaining power
concerning the issues to be addressed? What bargaining techniques are likely to influence that
person? What negotiating techniques has that individual decided to employ, and what are the most
effective ways to counter those tactics? As the instant transaction unfolds, strategic changes will
have to be made to respond to unanticipated disclosures or to changed circumstances.
When negotiators find themselves attributing certain characteristics to opponents, they must
carefully determine whether those attributes are based on specific information pertaining to those
particular opponents or to vague generalizations regarding people of their race. If persons only
bargained with individuals of the same race, they would quickly realize how different we all are.
Some opponents would behave cooperatively, while others would act in a competitive manner. Some
would be congenial, while other would be less pleasant. Some would exhibit win-lose tendencies,
while others would evidence win-win attitudes. Techniques that would be effective against some
opponents would be ineffective against others.
If, as my data suggest, there is no statistically significant correlation between student race or
student GPAs and their ability to achieve beneficial results on negotiation exercises, law firms may

16
wish to reconsider the degree of reliance they place on student class rank. Although AfricanAmerican students in my Legal Negotiation class had slightly lower mean GPAs than their Caucasian
counterparts, there was no difference in the average negotiation exercise results achieved by black
and white students. Law firms that place substantial value on class rank cutoffs may thus disqualify
African-American applicants with slightly lower GPAs who would be as likely to perform as well
with respect to critical lawyering skills as Caucasian applicants with slightly higher GPAs. I believe
that performance in skills courses, such as Legal Negotiation, Client Interviewing and Counseling,
and Trial Advocacy, is more predictive of the ability of graduating students to execute fundamental
lawyering tasks effectively than their grades in traditional examination courses. My data suggest that
this is particularly true with respect to African-American students. It would thus behoove law firms
that wish to treat all applicants fairly to look more closely at the grades achieved by AfricanAmerican students in skills-oriented courses, even when their overall GPAs are slightly below those
of Caucasian applicants.
Athletes and other performers who have to retain the services of professional negotiators
should not underestimate the bargaining abilities of African-American agents. There is no reason to
believe that black negotiators would be less capable in this regard than white agents. Some AfricanAmerican athletes and performers may think that black agents could not negotiate as effectively with
white owners and managers as white agents. Since the African-American students in my Legal
Negotiation course achieved results comparable to those attained by Caucasian students in situations
in which they were generally interacting with white students because of the reduced number of black
classmates, there is no reason to believe that black agents could not deal effectively with white
owners and managers. This is especially true today, given the increased number of African-American
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general managers and coaches who not only conduct many of the salary negotiations with sports
agents, but also have to interact regularly with their white team owners.

VI. CONCLUSION
The nine years of Legal Negotiation course data evaluated by me indicate the absence of any
statistically significant correlation between either student race or student GPAs and the results they
achieve on negotiation exercises. These findings would suggest that whatever cultural and behavioral
differences may exist between African-American and Caucasian students has no impact on their
ability to achieve beneficial negotiation exercise results. Since my data also indicate that the mean
GPAs of black students in my course were slightly below the mean GPAs of white students, law
firms considering African-American students may wish to look more closely at the performance of
those students in skills courses than in conventional law school courses. Individuals, such as athletes,
retaining agents to negotiate for them should not discriminate unfairly against African-American
attorneys because of unfounded stereotypical fears that they will not be as capable as Caucasian
agents.
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